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In the  ongoing  debate  as to  what should  and/or  can  be done about  the
scale  of developing  country  debt,  secondary  market  prices  for  government  and
government  guaranteed  debt  are  often  referred  to  as indicators  of the  value  of
the  outstanding  debt  of these  countries. These  prices  show  a wide variety  of
sizable  discounts  (to  give  but  two  examples,  the  debt of Peru trades  at 4
cents  on the  dollar  and the  debt  of Chile  trades  at 64 cents  on the  dollar
(July  1989)),  clearly  suggesting  skepticism  that  these  loans  will ever be
fully  repaid. Since  .he  secondary  market  price  of a country's  debt is thought
to  reflect  its  repayment  prospects,  an important  step for  judging  the  merits
of any  plan to  deal  with the  debt  crisis  is to identify  the factors  that
affect  those  prospects. These  factors  are typically  conceived  as being
features  associated  with the  country's  economic  performance  (e.g.  GNP,
exports,  etc.).  By  way of contrast,  here  we argue  that  certain
characteristics  of a country's  creditors  will  also influence  a country's
repayment  prospects,  and  hence  secondary  market  prices. In particular,  we
focus  on the  role  that  the  degree  of concentration  of a country's  debt in the
hands  of large  international  banks  plays  in determining  the  secondary  market
price  of that  debt.
We develop  a theoretical  model  that  distinguishes  between  two types  of
banks:  large  money  center  banks  and  smaller  regional  banks.  We show that the
percentage  of a country's  debt  held  by the  large  banks  affects  the  secondary
market  price  of that  country's  debt:  the  greater  the  degree  of concentration,
the  higher  the  secondary  market  price. Our empirical  invesftgation2
demonstrates  that  concentration  indeed  has a positive  effect  on secondary
market  prices.
The theoretical  model  assumes  that  the  debt renegotiation  process
possesses  three  fundamental  characteristics:  (i)  the  country's  motivation  to
repay  its  debt is its  fear  of  being  penalized  by its  creditors,  (ii)
penalizing  the  country  is costly  for the  banks,  and (iii)  although  the  amount
repaid  by tha  country  is  shared  prc  rata  by  a 11 banks,  he laroe  bank.  fa-a
greater  than  pro  rata  cost in  penalizing  the  country  due to the  damage  that
the  penalties  inflict  on their  extensive  business  interests  with these
countries. We show  that the  most favorable  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  for
the  banks  has the  country  repaying  an amount  that  is an increasing  function  of
the  proportion  of the  debt  owned  by the  large  banks. As modeled,  the  value  of
the  debt increases  as the  percentage  of the  debt  owned  by the  large  banks
increases. We construct  a  model  of the  secondary  market  to  show,  however,
that  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  large  banks  will  end  up owning
the  entire  stock  of debt.  The free-rider  problem,  evident  when it  comes to
discussions  of debt forgiveness  and  new  money  contributions,  also  plays  a
critical  role  here.  A small  bank  has  an incentive  to  hold out  and thereby
obtain  the  return  to ownership  of a unit  of debt  whose  value  will have
increased  in  accordance  with the  greater  portion  of the  total  debt owned  by
the  large  banks.  Since  each  small  bank  has the  same incentive,  we show  that
in  equilibrium  no debt  will  be bought  by the  large  banks  from the  small  ones
in  the secondary  market.
We conduct  an empirical  analysis  of secondary  market  prices  to  determine
how thAse  are  affected  by debt  concentration.  Our  measure  of the  degree  of
concentration  is  calculated  as the  ratio  of exposure  of the  nine largest  US3
banks  to the  exposure  of all  US banks that  are not in the  largest  24
(largeness  is defined  by asset  size). Quarterly  data over the  1986-1988
period  for  43 countries  is  employed. In addition  to a  measure  of
concentration,  two  other  types  of variables  are  considered  as possible
determinants  of secondary  market  prices: A first  set  of variables  include
borrower  country  characteristics  that  may function  as indicators  of a
rountrvls  repaymont  prospects;  suih  AS  deht ratios  and  GNP  rer capita.
Second,  bank exposure  to countries  and  bank capital  aggregates--variables  that
may reflect  regulatory  features  of the  creditor's  country--are  slso
considered.
Employing  a Tobit  model  we find that  the  degree  to  which  a country's  debt
is  concentrated  is  an important  and  statistically  significant  detarminant  of
the  secondary  market  price  of that  debt.  Specifically,  a higher  debt
concentration  is  found  to imply  a higher  secondary  market  price.  Our
estimations  suggest  that  as concentration  is  doubled  from  its  sample  mean of 5
to 10,  secondary  market  prices  show  an increase  of 7 cents  to 30 cents  on the
dollar  from  their  sample  mean of 48.
Our  finding  of a positive  effect  of debt  concentration  on secondary
market  prices  has a  number  of important  implications  for  policy  making  and
theoretical  debates. The first  lesson  is that  secondary  market  prices  are  not
influenced  solely  by the  "good"  or "bad"  behavior  of the  debtor  countries.
The  degree  of debt  concentration  is a feature  that  characterizes  creditors:
the  structure  of the  banking  system,  the  regulatory  systems  in  the lender
countries,  and optimal  portfolio  considerations  are  among  the  factors  that
might  lead  to  a  particular  distrioution  of the  debt  among  banks  in the  initial
syndication  of a loan. The  contribution  of each  of these  factors  to debt4
concentration  and hence to secondary market prices, should be taken into
account when assessing  he value of debt forgiveness programs, debt-equity
swans; and virtually any other scheme that relies on secondary market prices.
Secondly, the role that differing characteristics among creditor banks may
play in any negotiation--in our case, the asymmetry in the extent of banks
involvement, exclusive of debt, with these countries--is an important feature
that has been neglected, in  most part, by the theoretical and empirical
literature.  Lastly, the (theoretical)  presence of free-rider problems in our
model of the secondary debt market indicates, once again, that there may be
important room for coordinated responses to the debt crisis.
Our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the main
bargaining model between the creditor banks and the debtor country.  Section 3
presents a very simplified model of the secondary debt market.  Section 4
consists of an empirical investigation of secondary market pricing behavior,
and Section 5 cooicludes.
2.  A Model of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiation
Over the past decade the question as to why debtor countries repay any of
their debts has received much attention.  As is  well recognized, there must
exist either some benefit from repayment or some cost from repudiation in
order to support positive lending to sovereign countries.  To name but a few
examples, Eaton dnd  Gersovitz (1981), Eaton (1989), Bulow and Rogoff (1989b),
and Rosenthal (1990) have examined the role of reputation in sustaining loans
(where default is taken to imply the exclusion from credit markets in the
future), Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) the role of benefits from repayment,5
and Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Fernandez and Glazer (1990), and Fernandez
(1990) tha effects of penalties more generally.
Our principal interest hera is to develop a penalty based model of
sovereign-eebt renegotiations tbat is able to provide an explanation for why
the secondary market price of a country's debt and the concenCration cf this
debt in the hands of the top US banks is positively correlated,  Our
explanation centers on two characterizations that we make of sovereign-debt
renegotiations.  First, that penalizing a defaulting country is costly to the
banks and, second, that there is an important asymmetry between the large
established international banks and the smaller creditor banks.
We construct a sequential bargaining model (a la Rubinstein (1982))
between the debtor country and the "large" banks component of ics creditors.
The banks are assumed to possess the ability to punish a country that does rot
repay its renegotiated debt.'  Our model (a variant of Fernandez (1990))
differs, however, in a critical aspect from the other sequential bargaining
models that rely on penalties.  In, for example, Bulow and Rogoff (1989a)
banks always have an incentive to penalize a defaulting country (by seizing
suwe  pULLioUi  UL  iLS  traded output), since they obtain  .. :-ediate  net benefit
from doing so, namely a certain percentage of the country's traded output. 2
In Fernandez (1990), by contrast, there are equilibria in which the banks
never penalize the country since to ao so is costly and does not guarantee
eventual repayment.  The economics that underlies these two different
modelling strategies concerns the nature of the punishments which banks can
'They  cannot, however, precommit to punishment.
2Bulow and Rogoff suggest that their results can also be extended to
costly punishrants though implicit in their argument is that banks can commit
to bearing small costs.6
apply. If these  penalties  consist  primarily  of the  seizure  of traded  goods
which  can  be immediately  translated  into  a  net  bene.it  for the  banks
(independently  of whether  or not  the  country  repays),  then  the  Bulow  arsd
Rogoff  type  model  of  debt renegotiation  is  best able to  capture  this.  If,
however,  penalties  cannot  be commited  to  and  primarily  consist  of the  negaton
of trade  credits  and/or  sanctions  applied  by the  creditor  countries'
government  (or  even  exclusion  from  all  future  credit  markets),  in other  words,
penalties  whose  distinguishing  feature  is  that  they  do not, in and  of
themselves,  provide  a  net  benefit  to  creditors,  then  a model  of costly
penalties  is  more  appropriate. We choose  to  work with the  latter
conceptualization  of the  penalty  structure.
Our  second  critical  distinction  is  that  between  large  international  banks
and  smaller,  primarily  domestic,  banks. The  analyses  of sovereign-debt
renegotiations  mentioned  previously  have,  by and large,  abstracted  from any
differentiation  among  the  creditor  banks  (an  exception  is Fernandez  and  Kaaret
(1988))  although,  of  course,  free  rider  problems  have received  some attention
(e.g.  Krugman  (1988)  and  Sachs  (1983)). Rescheduling,  however,  is an
extremely  complicated  process  involving  hundreds  of banks  and loans  of various
terms  and  maturities. Negotiation  typically  takes  place  between  the  debtor
country  and  a creditor  committee  consisting  of a small  group  of very large
internationai  banks  (e.g.  Citibank,  Chemical  Bank,  Manufacturers  Hanover,
etc.). What distinguishes  these  banks,  aside  from  sheer  size,  is the  nature
of their  relationship  with the  debtor  countries. These  banks  provide  services
to their  domestic  customers  to enable  trade  between  them  and the  country.
They often  have branches  in these  countries  and a consideraCle  portion  of
their  profits  is  derived  from  other  business  with these  countries  and theircustomers. The small  banks,  on the  other  hand,  only entered  the  international
arena  temporariiJ  in the  credit  boom  of the  seventies  and  do not  otherwise
a.ave  extensive  links  with  the  debtor  countries. Consequently,  any  action
taken  to  punish  the  country  is  bound  to  be more  costly  for  the large
international  banks  than  for  the  small  banks. We now turn to a  more formal
description  of the  model.
We consider  the following  situation. Two  pa;.ies,  one  consisting  of the
large  creditor  banks (which  we will  henceforth  call the  large  bank,  B, and
assume  that  it acts  as one  agent,  ignoring  any  problems  which  may  exist  within
this  coalition),  and the  other  consisting  of the  debtor  countrv,  are  engaged
in  negotiating  over  how  much  of its  debt  the  country  must  repay.  In order  to
simplify  an already  quite  complex  problem,  we will consider  repayment  of the
debt to  be once  and  for  all  and  not over  a numbe:  of periods. 3 Bargaining
takes  place  over  discrete  time  t  E  (1,2,...). In  every  odd  period  the  large
bank  offers  a debt  settlement  xt,  O<xt,D  which  specifies  the  amount  that the
banks  are asking  to  be repaid. D>O is the  amount  of the  country's  outstanding
debt.  The country  (C)  then  responds  by either  accepting  the  offer  (Y)  Ur
rejecting  it (N).  If the  country  accepts  the  offer,  negotiations  are  over.
The  country  then  pays  the  banks  xt  and  the  remainder  of the  debt,  D-xt,  is
forgiven. If the  country  rejects  the  offer,  the  large  bank  must then  make a
decision  as to the  level  of punishment Pt2O,  to inflict  on the  country  that
pericd. After the  country  is  punished  (the  punishment  can  be zero),  time
advances  one  period.
3Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989a)  deal  with this  problem  by impOsing  conditions
on the  discount  factors  of the  two  parties  and  specifying  a time  horizon  after
which  all  production  in the  country  ceases.S
In  every  even  period  it is the  country's  turn  tu  make  a debt settlement
offer  Yt  specifying  the  amount  that  the  country  is  willing  to repay. The
banks  then  respond  by either  accepting  (Y)  or rejecting  (N)  the  offer.  Once
again,  an acceptance  indicates  the  end  of negotiations  and the  country  pay,
the  banks  yt,  the  latter  forgiving  the  remainder  D-yt. A rejection  leaves  the
banks  with a punishment  decision  to be made in chat  period,  pt. After the
country  is  punished,  time  advances  one  period. This game  can continue  for  a
potentially  infinite  number  of  periods. See Fig-re  1 for the  extensive  form
of this  game.
It is  costly  for  the  large  ban,,s  to punish  the  country. This  cost c-c(p)
is  assumed  to  be an increasing,  cotntinuous,  convex  function  of the  punishment
level  with c'(O)-O  and  c'(-)- and is incurred  in  each  period  in  which  a
penalty  is  applied. Thus,  in the  same  period  that the  large  banks  are
choosing  a punishment  level,  they  are  also choasing  the  level  of the  costs
that  they  themselves  will  bear that  period. T'hese  costs  can  be thought  of as
lobbying  costs  (incurred  in order  to persuade  Congress  and  other interested
parties  to accept  harming  certain  domestic  constituencies,  such as exporters
to the  country,  when  punishing  the  debtor)  and  costs  to the  operations  of the
banks  within  that  country  and to the  profits  derived  from  their  servicing  of
domestic  clients  (who  use these  banks  as intermediaries  to do business  with
the  country). This is  where the  asymmetry  between  the  large  creditor  banks
and the  many small  banks  takes  its  bite.  Although  both large  and  small  banks
share r  L#"  in  any  repayment  by the  country,  the  costs  incurred  in
punishing  the  country  are  not shared  g.  rata.  Although  debt ccntraKts
require  some  costs  to  be shared  pro  La  (court  expenses,  fer  example),  the
large  banks  will find  it  much  more  costly  to disturb  their  normal  operations9
with the  debtor  countries  than  the  small  banks.  These  costs  are  not  written
into  the  debt  contract. For  simplicity,  we assumeu  chat  this  asymmetry  between
large  and  small  creditor  banks  is such that  the  larga  banks  bear all the  coscs
of punishing  the  defaulting  country.' Hence,  if the  large  banks  are  able to
obtain  a payment  of Z from the  country  and  a i r  the fraction  of that  country's
lebt  owned  by the  large  banks,  then  aZ is  the  payment  received  by the  large
banks. Any  cost ;ncuLred  in  obtaining  this  payment,  however,  is borne  in i_s
entirety  by the  large  banks.
We now  turn  to a disctussion  of each  party's  payoff. The large  bank is
assumed  to maximize  the  discounted  value  of its  share  of the  country's  payment
net  of the  cost  it incurs  in  punishing  the  latter. The large  bank's  payoff
from  a settlcme;t  z reached  in  period  T is
j  sb-c(p  t)  +  U6b-l  ('  )
t-l
where  O< 6b<l  is  the  banks'  common  discount  factor.
The country  attempts  to  minimize  the  discounted  value  of its  punishments
and  payment. Consequently,  its  payoff  from  a settlement  z in  period  'r  is
T-.  t-1  T-1
v  6  t-p  -6  z  (2)
t-l 
'What  is  essential  is that  the  large  banks'  share  of the  costs  be greater
than  their  share  of the  country's  repayment.10
where  0<6,<l  is the  country's  discount  factor. Thus,  if the  banks  punish  the
country  for  two  periods  before  obtaining  a settlement  of x3, the  large  banks'
payoff  from  the  entire  play is -(c(p1)+6bc(p2)]+4Ex3,  and the  country's  is
- P[+6cP 2+6cx 3]-
We are interested  in examining  the  subgame-perfect  equilibria  of this
game.  By imposing  this  refinement  of Nash  equilib:ia,  we are ruling  out those
equilibria  based  on non-credible  threats. That is,  we are  eliminating
equilibria  that  possess  the  characteristics  that  in some  subgame  a player
would  not actually  find  the  sequence  of actions  dictated  by its  strategy  to be
a best  response  to the  other  player's  strategy  in that  same subgame. More
technically,  the  strategies  of all the  players  form  a subgamae-perfect
equilibrium  of the  game if they  form  a Nash  equilibrium  of the  game and if,  in
addition,  they  induce  equilibria  on all  subgames  of the  game.
As shown  in Fernandez  (1990),  the  type  of game  described  above  has  many
subgame-porfect  equilibria,  including  some  inefficient  ones.  One efficient
equilibria,  for  example,  has the  country  never  repaying  any part  of its  debt
and  the  banks  never  punishing  the  country  for  this  behavior. To see  why this
is  an equilibrium,  note that if the  b&nks  never  threaten  to punish,  the
country  never  has  an incentive  to repay. Any  deviation  by the  bank,  that is,
any  positive  level  of punishment,  will simply  be ignored  by the  country
(although  it is costly  for the  latter)  since  in the following  period  the
country's  best response  will still  be not to  repay  given  its  expectation  of no
future  punishments  in response  to this  behavior.11
We will  concentrate  here solely  on the  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  most
favorable  to the  banks. Consider  the  following  pair  of strategies. In the
first  period  the large  bank  makes  an offer  x where 5
_  1-6  6  (3)
b c
If this  offer  is rejected,  the  banks  punish  the  country  by an amount
c(p)  [- 6 b 6 c]
_  c~  2  (4)
a6b
In  every  even  period,  if in  all  preceding  odd  periods  the  bank  has punished  by
the  amount  p the  Lountry's  rejection  of its  offer,  then  the  bank accepts  any
offer  greater  or equal  to  y and rejects  any  offer  strictly  smaller  than  y,
where
_  Sbp  (5)
bc
If,  however,  in  some  preceding  odd  period,  Pt  differed  from  p, then the  bank
accepts  any  offer  y>O.
5We  are  assuming  that  we are in  a debt  crisis  situation,  i.e.  D>x, so
that  even in  the  most favorable  equilibrium  for  the  banks  the  country  does  not
repay  its  entire  debt.  It is  not  difficult  to construct  a 1%rger  game,
modeling  the  initial  loan  decision,  such  that there  is  uncertainty  prior to
the  making  of the loan  (say,  as to the  c(p)  function)  so that  D>x is the
result  of an  unfavorable  shock  to the  bank's  cost function.12
In  every  odd  period,  subject  to  prior  compliance  with the  odd-period
punishment  behavior  described  above,  the  bank  offers  x.  Once again,  any  prior
deviation  from the  odd-period  punishment  behavior  implies  that  in all
subsequent  even periods  the  bank offers  x-O, i.e.  complete  forgiveness  of the
debt. Note that  the  bank  never  punishes  the  country  on even periods  and  that
p is  a function  of a and  so, therefore,  are  x-x(a)  and  y-y(Q).
The  country's  strategy  in the  firsc  period  is to accept  any offer  x<x.
In every  even  period,  if in  all  preceding  odd  periods  the  bank has  punished
the  country  by an amount  p, the  country  offers  y-y.  If in some  preceding  odd
period  the  punishment  has  been  of a different  magnitude,  the  country  offers
y-O.  In  every  odd  period,  subject  to the  bank's  prior  compliance  with the
odd-period  punishment  rule,  the  country  accepts  any  offer  of x<x  and rejects
any  offer  strictly  greater  than  x.  Once  again,  any  deviation  by the  bank from
this  behavior  implies  that  in all  subsequent  even  periods  the  country  rejects
any  offer  strictly  greater  than  zero  and  accepts  x-O.
It is  not difficult  to check  that  this  is a  pair of subgame-perfect-
equilibrium  strategies. The  play  of these  strategies  has the  bank  making  an
offer  of  x in the  first  period  which  the  country  accepts. Since  agreement  is
reached  in the  first  period  without  any  punishments  actually  inflicted,  this
is  an efficient  equilibrium. 6
To understand  how subgame  perfection  imposes  restrictions  on players'
strategies,  note that  what the  bank might  wish to  do is to threaten  to
severely  punish  the  country  by an amount,  say,  of p, unless  the  latter  repays
6A proof  that  this strategy  yields  the  large  bank its  greatest  payoff  is
in  Fernandez  (1990).13
its  entire  debt.  If the  country  were to "believe"  this  threat,  St  would  repay
the  debt in its  entirety  as long  as the  discounted  (absolute)  value  of  being
punished  forever  (every  odd  period  from  now  till  infinity)  were  greater  than
the  value  of the  debt, i.e.  p(l-6)-1>D. Let  us examine,  however,  the  subgame
in  which  the  country  rejects  this  offer. The  bank's  payoff  from  doing  so
would  at  most be -c(p)+a6bD.  If this  payoff  were  negative,  however,  the
bank's  strategy  would  not  be subgame  perfect  since  it  could  always  choose  not
to impose  the  punishment  and  obtain  a  payoff  no smaller  than  zero.  Thus,  in
the  odd-period  punishment  strategy  the  punishment  level  can  be no greater  than
the  p that  satisfies
-c(p)  +  aGby - 0  (6)
where  y-60p(1-60,)  y.  Using  this  restriction  to solve  for  p results  in (4).
Lemma  1: The  amount  of its  debt that  a country  will repay  and, therefore,
the  value  of a share  of a country's  debt in the  equilibrium  outcome  generated
by the  strategies  that  yield  the  large  bank its  greatest  payoff  (i.e.  the
strategies  described  above)  is an increasing  function  of the  share  of the  debt
held  by the  large  banks.
Proof: Use of the  implicit  function  rule  on (6)  yields
dp/da--6g/[a6b-(l-6b6d)c'(p)].  Recalling  that  c(p)  is  a convex  function  and
evaluating  the  denominator  at (6)  yields  dp/da  >0.  By (3),  x is  an increasing
function  of p.  Thus,  as  a increases,  the  level  of punishment  that is credible
increases  and  with it the  large  bank's  payoff  and the  value  of a share  of
debt.1114
Lemma  1  establishes  that  as the  degree  of concentration  of a country's
debt  in the  hands  of the large  bank  increases,  so does the  amount  of debt that
will  be repaid. The intuition  behind  this  result  is  straightforward:  as the
degree  of concentration  increases,  the  payment  received  by the  large  bank for
a given  punishment  level  increases  accordingly. This  means that  the  large
bank  can  credibly  increase  its  punishment  threat  (and  thus  total  repayment)
since  its  ability  to  obtain  a  greater  share  of any  payment  allows  it to
credibly  withstand  a greater  cost  of punishment.
3.  A Model  of the  Secondary  Debt  Market
If the  value  of a share  of a country's  debt is an increasing  function  of
the  proportion  of its  debt  that  is  owned  by the  large  banks,  won't  the latter
attempt  to  buy  up  the  debt of the  small  banks  on the  secondary  debt  market?
The  answer  t,  this  question  is far  from  trivial  and  will depend  on how the
secondary  market  is  modeled. A natural  extension  of the  model  discussed  above
to include  a secondary  market  would  be to allow  bidding  between  large  and
small  banks in  the  secondary  market  to  alternste  periodically  (or  be
simultaneous)  with bargaining  between  the  large  banks  and  the  country.
Unfortunately,  this  is an extremely  complex  game to solve  since  we have now
introduced  a state  variable,  namely  the  fraction  of  the  country's  debt owned
by Lhe  large  banks,  into  the  bargaining  game  between  debtor  and  creditor.
As an alternative,  we somewhat  simplify  the  bargaining  model  between  the
large  bank and  the  country  and  allow  the  secondary  market  to function  solely
prior  to  any  bargaining  between  these  two.  While  the  latter  is,  admittedly,
not  a realistic  depiction  of the  functioning  of the  secondary  debt  market, it
is  one  of the  few formulations  of this  problem  that  we have been  able to solve15
and it allows  us to  bring  out  clearly  the  intuition  as to  why one  would  not
necessarily  expect  the  large  banks  to end  up owning  the  entire  stock  of debt.
We also  modify  our  previous  specification  of the  punishment  function. Note
that,  as previously  formulated,  although  punishment  of the  country  is costly
and  thereby  limits  the  level  of threat  that is  credible,  no costs  are actually
borne  by the  large  bank in  equilibrium. Hence,  if the  large  bank initially
owned  a proportion  ao  of the  debt  and  bought  the  outstanding  debt  at the  fair
price  of x(a-l)/D  per  share,  it  would  make a positive  profit  since  it would
pay the  small  banks (l-a.)x(a-l)  but  obtain  a revenue  of x(a-l),  yielding  it a
net  gain  of aox(c.-l).  In our  new  formulation  of the  problem,  the  essential
difference  is the  introduction  of a cost that  must be borne  by the  large  bank
in  equilibrium. The  bank is  now  able,  in  each  period,  to punish  costlessly
the  defaulting  country. It  must,  however,  bear instead  a once-and-for-all
upfront  cost  L(p).  L(p) is  assumed  to  be an increasing,  continuous,  convex
function  of the  periodic  punishment  level  p chosen  by the large  bank  with
L(O)-O,  L'(O)-O  and L'(-)-£. The  bank  cannot  choose  a periodic  punishment
level  greater  than  the  p specified  hv L(n).  Thiq  cror  con  he thought  of as
lobbying  costs  and (perhaps  partial)  compensation  to those  domestic  parties
whose  interests  would  be damaged  if the  large  bank (and  perhaps  also the
government  of the  creditor's  country)  were to  actually  penalize  the  debtor.
Once again,  these  costs  are  assumed  to  be incurred  solely  by the  large  bank.
Let  us first  turn  to solving  for  the  best (for  the  large  bank)  subgame-
perfect  equilibrium  of the  new  bargaining  game  between  the  large  bank  and the
debtor  country. It is  not difficult  to show  that,  given  a chosen  periodic
punishment  level  of p, the  bargaining  game  has  a unique  subeame-perfect
equilibrium  in  which  the  country  repays:16
x  - (7)
in the  first  round  of negotiation.
The  problem,  therefore,  facing  the  large  bank is to choose  an optimal
level  of p.  This is  given  by the  solution  to the  following  maximization
proble,m:
Max  ai - L(p)  (8)
p
yielding  the  first  order  condition:
LI-  CZ---  (9)
1-6 6( b  c
which  implicitly  defines  an optimal  p(a)  and therefore,  using  (7),  an
x(W)-p(a)(l-6bdCY'.  Differentiation  of (9)  yields pl/8a  >  0, so that  although
subgame  perfection  doesn't  play the  same  role  here  as in the  previous
bargaining  model  (where  it limited  the level  of the  threat  that  would  be found
credible),  the  level  of punishment  that  the  large  bank  will choose  to inflict
on the  country  is  nonetheless  an increasing  function  of the  share  of the  debt
that  it  owns (as  a result  of the  upfront  costs  that it incurs).
We now return  to the  secondary  market  problem. The  structure  of this
game  is as follows. In  each  period  in  which the  secondary  market  functions,17
the  large  bank  makes  a series  of offers  (zi,d,)  establishing  the  price  per
share,  z,,  that  it  is  willing  to  pay for  up to di  shares  of debt owned  by
small  bank i.  Note  that  each  bank  may receive  more than  one price-quantity
offer,  i.e.  (zi,di)  can  be a vector  of prices  and  quantities,  and that  a small
bank  can  choose  to tender  less  than  di.  Let  di<di  be the  quantity  of debt
actually  tendered  by small  bank i  at the  price  zi. Thus zidi  is the  revenue
received  by small  bank i  when it sells  di  shares  at price  zi  per share.  Each
small  bank is  able  to accept  (or  partially  ac:ept)  or reject  any  of its
offers. At the  end  of each  period  t the  large  bank,  now  owning  a proportion
of the  country's  debt  at,  can  choose  whether  to end its  attempts  to purchase
debt on the  secondary  market  by entering  into  negotiations  with the country  or
to  continue  its  presence  in the  secondary  market  for  an additional  period.
Whenever  it  enters  into  negotiations  with the  country  then,  by Lemma  1, an
agreement  between  the  two  will  be reached  in that  same  period. Thus, if  at
the  end  of period  e  the  bank decides  to enter  into  negotiations  with the
country,  its  payoff  from this  play  is
t 1 i  b  itZit +6b  ex(  (10)
the  ith  small  bank's  payoff  is
7Note  that  in this  fashion  we preclude  the  possibility  of the large  bank
making  a small  bank  a strict  take-it-or-leave-it  offer.18
eb  dt-I.t + 6b  (D  E  d  )D  x(a
where  Di  is the  quantity  of the  country's  debt initially  owned  by small  bank i
and  at  - a.+(EtEjdjt)D-1.  (Note  that  both the  small  and  large  banks  have the
same  discount  factor  6b*)
We first  consider  the  case in  which  the  banks  have  only one  period  in
which  to trade  in the  secondary  market  prior  to  bargaining  commencing  between
the  large  bank and  the  country. Notice  that,  in  equilibrium,  no trade  can
take  place  for  a  price less  than  i(al)/D  per  share,  where  a, is the  proportion
of the  debt  owned  by the large  bank at the  end  of period  one.  To see  why, let
Z<i(aj)/D  be the  price  per share  received  by bank  j for  dj  shares. Then,  by
continuity  of p(a),  it is always  possible  to find  an c>O  such that
(t/D)k(a 1-cD- 1) >  cz,  so that  small  bank  j would  be better  off reducing  its
quantity  of shares  tendered  by E  and  receiving  an £/D  share  of the  country's
payment. Thus,  if there  is  any trade,  the  minimum  price  at which it  will take
place  is  i(al)/D  per  share. This  enables  us to establish  the  following  Lemma.
Lemma  2:  Given  the  subgame-perfect  equilibrium  to the  creditor-debto-
bargaining  game  described  above,  in equilibrium  no trade  will take  place in
the  secondary  debt  market. The  game  between  the large  bank,  the  small  banks,
and the  country  ends in the first  period  with  an agreement  between  the large
banks  and the  country  of i(ao)  where  ao  is the  large  bank's  initial  share  of
the  debt.
Proof: By the  preceding  discussion,  if any  trade  between  large  and small
banks  takes  placc  it does  so at a minimum  price  per  share  of i(aj)/D. Thus,
assuning  that the  iarge  bank  can  choose  to  buy  A  shares  at the  price  of19
i(Q,+A/D)/D  per share  (the  best  possible  scenario  for  the  large  bank),  we can
look  at the  following  optimization  problem  for  the  large  bank:
Max  a c(aO A) - L(p(a 0 a))  (12)
By (8)  and (9),  the  maximum  is  achieved  at  &-O.  Since  the  large  bank  always
has the  option  of buying  zero  debt  and  obtaining  this  payoff,  there  will be no
trade  between  large  and small  banks  in the  secondary  debt  market.11
Let  us now consider  a T period  version  of this  same  game.  The large  bank
now  has the  option,  in  each period  except  the  Tth,  of continuing  to trade  on
the  secondary  market  for  an additional  period  or stopping  the  game  by entering
into  negotiations  with the  country. This  means  that  a small  bank can  no
longer  rely,  when it rejects  a  price  offer,  on immediately  obtaining  its  share
of the  country's  payment. The large  bank  can  choose  to attempt  to increase
its  share  the following  period  and thus,  by delaying  an agreement  with the
country,  decrease  zhe  small  bank's  payoff. It is not  difficult  to show,
however,  that  the  zero trade  result  is  maintained.
Lemma  3:  Identical  to Lemma  2.
Proof: Consider  a game  that  has continued  to period  T.  In that  period,
by Lemma  2, there  will be no trade. Consequently,  -he  maximum  length  of the
game is to  period  T-1 since  the  large  bank  does  not gain  by delaying  that
period. In period  T-1, however,  no small  bank  will accept  a price  per share
smaller  than i(aT.l)/D since  the  threat  of delaying  for  an additional  period
is  not  credible. But  by (12),  buying  all  additional  debt a* the  price20
'(aT.l)/D  makes  the  large  bank  worse  off than  not  buying  any  debt at all.
Thus,  no trade  will  occur in  this  period  either. Continuing  this  logic  by
backward  induction  establishes  that  the  threat  of continuing  to trade  for  any
number  of additional  periods  does  not  enable  the  large  bank to obtain  price
concessions  from  any  small  bank since  this threat  is  not  credible.
Consequently,  the  game  will end in the  first  period  with zero trade  and an
agreement  of i(oa)  between  the  country  and the large  bank.11
This section  has  established  that there  is no reason  to  believe  that,
simply  because  the  value  of the  debt increases  the  more concentrated  its
ownership  becomes,  all  the  debt  will  end  up in the  hands  of the large  bank.
The free-rider  problem  is  also  endemic  to this scenario. While  each small
bank  would  be better  off if  another  small  bank sold some  of its  debt to the
large  bank  or if all  small  banks  coordinated  and sold  part (or  even all) of
their  debt to the  large  bank,  the  fact that  each  small  bank  has the incentive
to  hold out  implies  that in  equilibrium  no debt  will  be sold.8
4.  Emoirical  Issues
An implication  of the  theoretical  model  developed  in this  paper is that
the increased  concentration  of a country's  debt in the  hands  of large  banks
has  a positive  effect  on the  secondary  market  price  of that  country's  debt.
Our  purpose  in this  section  is to  provide  an empirical  analysis  of secondary
market  prices  so as to investigate  the  presence  of the relation  posited  by the
eIn  reality,  the  concentration  of debt  has increased  over time,  but this
can  also  be due  to renegotiated  (coordinated)  deals  among  banks  and  countries.
In any  case,  concentration  has  not increased  to the  extent  of reaching  a
corner  solution.21
model. Nevertheless,  although  our  empirical  finding  is in  accordance  with our
theoretical  result,  our  empirical  analysis  is not  a test  of the  model
developed  previously. To put it  another  way, our theoretical  model,  which is
In accordance  with the  stylized  facts,  is one  plausible  explanation  of our
empirical  finding.
In  most  empirical  studies  of secondary  market  prices,  the  occurrence  of
trade  in the  secondary  market,  as well as the  magnitude  of secondary  market
prices  (or  discounts)  is investigated  only  as a function  of various  country
characteristics.  These  country  characteristics  are  economic  variables,  such
as debt-to-exports  ratio  and  real  per  capita  GNP, that  presumably  indicate  a
country's  repayment  prospects  and events  of non-payments,  rescheduling
agreements  (Berg  and  Sachs  (1989),  Cohen (1988),  Hajivassiliou  (1988),
Huizinga  (1989),  Sachs  and  Huizinga  (1987),  and Purcell  and  Orlanski  (1988)).
Although  there  is  not a unique  set  of variables  derived  from  a specific
theoretical  specification,  there  is,  by now, a large  body of empirical  studies
of developing  country  debt that  has employed  economic  characteristics  of
borrowers. 9 Such  variables  have  been included for  example,  in studies  that
attempt  to predict  the  occurrence  of repayments  difficulties,  and in  studies
that  investigate  credit  terms  (for  a review  see  Eaton  and  Taylor  (1986);
recent  studies  include  Ozler (1990a,b)).  The relation  between  non-payment
events  and lender  banks'  stock  market  values  have been investigated  in  Ozler
(1989).
gIncorporation  of political  factors  to such  studies  has  been limited. An
exception  is  Ozler  and  Tabellini  (1990),  where the  authors  employ  measures  of
political  instability  among  the  determinants  of the  level  of debt
accumulation.22
An exception  to  using  only  country  characteristics  in studying  secondary
market  prices  is  Ozler  and  Huizinga  (1990). That study  focuses  on the
regulatory  structure  in  a lender  country  and investigates  how the  presence  of
deposit  insurance  influences  the  secondary  mnarket  prics  formation. Bank
exposure  distribution  and  capital  aggregates  are  considered  in the  empirical
investigation.  10
In this  paper,  we introduce  yet  another  significant  dimension  to the
investigation  of secondary  market  prices--one  that  characterizes  the lenders
themselves. We examine  the  concentration  of  debt in  the  hands  of large  banks
relative  to small  banks.  In  what follows,  we first  describe  an empirical
model  that  will be used for  the  analysis  of secondary  market  prices. The
model  described  is  a Tobit  model.  Second,  we present  a cursory  investigation
of the  data and  discuss  how  debt  concentration  is  measured. Our basic  measure
of debt concentration  is the  ratio  of the  exposure  of the  nine largest  U.S.
banks  to the  exposure  of U.S.  banks that  are  not in  the largest  24 (largeness
is defined  by asset  size).  Finally,  results  of our  estimation  are  presented,
and  the  primary  finding  that  increased  debt  concentration  has a negative
(positive)  impact  on secondary  market  discounts  kprices)  is  shown  to be robust
to alternative  empirical  specifications.
4.1  Epuirical  SDecification
The trading  of loans  at a discount  in the  secondary  market  has taken
place  only for  some  of the  indebted  countries. Define  T* as follows  (for
convenience,  time  and  country  indicatcrs  are  omitted):
l°Bank  characteristics  are  also found  to  be significant  determinants  of
commercial  bank  behavior  when these  are  confronted  with a  menu of options (see
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Diwan (1990)).23
T  - 00+  ul  (13)
where  T*  - a latent  variable  such that,  if  T* >  0 we observe  trading  at a
discount  in the  secondary  market,  but if T* S 0 we do not  observe
trading  at a discount  in the  secondary  market,
- variables  that  determine  the  occurrence  of tradiag  in the
secondary  market,
ul - normally  distributed  error  term  with standard  error  a,.
As  will be discussed  in  more  detail  in the  data section,  variables  in  +
measure  the  creditworthiness  indicators  of countries  as well as the  extent  of
their  private  debt.
The  magnitude  of discounts  is  determined  as described  below:
D  - '  +  u2 (14)
where  D*  - discount  in the  secondary  market. Discount  is  defined  as (1-
price),  where  prine is the  secondary  market  price  of $1 of debt.
- in addition  to the  variables  in  X, a measure  of the  concentration
of a country's  debt in the  hands  of large  U.S.  banks.
U2  - normally  distributed  random  error  term  with a statidard  error  o2.
However,  we observe  positive  discounts  only  when  T* >  0.  Since  no discounts
are recorded  for those  countries  whose  debt  is not traded  in the  secondary
market,  their  debt  appears  to be at par.  Accordingly,  the  observed  discounts
would  be described  as follows:
D - D* if T* >  0,  (1S)
D  - 0  otherwise.24
The econometric  model  described  with equ&tions  (13-15)  is a Tobit  model  (Tobin
1958)  (type  cwo  Tobit  model  according  to the  classification  of Amemiya
(1984)). The  standard  Tobit  model  is  a special  case  of the  model  where  T*-D*.
It is  weli known  that  ordinary  least  squares  estimation  method  is not the
appropriate  one  for  the type  of econometric  model  considered. The  parameter
estimates  are  known  to  be biased  and inconsistent  if  equation  (14)  is
estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares  over the  observations  with  Rositive
discounts. Alternatively,  one  may  conduct  the  estimation  by employing
ordinary  least  squares  over  all the  observations  by assigning  zeros  to those
countries  for  which  positive  discounts  are  L.)t  recorded. This  approach
implies  that  if the  debt  of those  countries  were traded,  the secondary  market
price  would  be zero,  which  obviously  is incorrect.  Accordingly,  we employ  a
censored  regression  estimation  technique  as discussed  next.
It has  been shown  that  Heckman's  two-step  estimator  (Heckman  (1976))  can
be used in this  type  of  model (Amemiya  (1984))  and that  it  yields  consistent
parameter  estimates. According  to this  method,  one first  estimates  the  probit
model  described  in  equation  (13)  using  maximum-likelihood  procedure  and
obtains  the  inverse  Mills'  ratio  (or  the  hazard  rate). 1"  The discounts  then
are estimated  according  to the  following  second  stage  equation  by employing
only the  observations  in the  sample  with positive  recorded  discounts:
D - ' +  1A  + C2  for T*  > 0  (16)
"From the  estimation  of (13)  on obtains  w  and  n,  where they  are the
density  and  distribution  functions  of the  standard  normal  evaluated  at (00/o,)
respectively.  The ratio  w/Q is the  hazard  rate.25
where  A - inverse  of the  Mills'  ratio  (hazard  rate),
C2  - error  term  with mean  zero. 12
Equation  (16)  is estimated  after  replacing  A  w th its  estimated  value  from
equation  (13),  and  using  ordinary  least  squares  method. The  problem  with this
approach  is that  the  asymptotic  variance-covariance  matrix  of the  parameters
obtained  in the  second  stage  is  not  consistent.  13  It  has  been pointed  out  by
Lee  (1982),  however,  that  consistent  estimates  of the  variance-covariance
matrix  can  be obtained  by applying  an estimator  similar  to the
heteroskedasticity  consistent  estimator  developed  by 'hite (1980).
Accordingly,  in this  paper  we use Heckman's  two-step  estimation  method  and
follow  Lee (1982).14
4.2  A Cursory  Inspection  of the  Data
Equations  (13)  rnd (16)  above  will  be used to investigate  the  relation
between  secondary  market  discounts  and debt  concentration. In this  section  we
discuss  the  variables  that  enter  X  of equation  (13)  and  *' of (16),  as well as
characteristics  of our sample. In  X  we include  country  characteristics  that
are  relevant  for  repayment  prospects  and the  extent  of private  indebtedness  of
12Variance  of £2 is  given  by eq. (89),  Amemiya  (1984),  p. 32.
13Heckman's  method  does  not require  the  joint  normality  of D*  and  T*.
The detailed  discussion  of the  method  summarized  here and the  underlying
assumptions  are in  Amemiya  p. 13  and  pp. 32-33.
"'It  should  be noted  that  the  identifying  variable  in the  estimation  of
equations  (13)  and (16)  is  a measure  of debt  concentration.  Our theoretical
model  takes  as given  the  existence  of a secondary  market  and therefore  does
not address  the  question  as to  whether  debt  concentration  should  be included
in (13). As long  as all the  debt is  not  owned  solely  by one large  bank,
however,  it is  difficult  to  see  why  a greater  concentration  would  lead  to that
debt  not  being  traded.26
a country. 0',  in addition  to the  variables  in  X, primarily  includes  a
measure  of concentration  of a  country's  debt.  Some specifications  include  in
0'  additional  creditor  country  factors,  such  as the  exposure  distribution  of
banks,  so as to  ensure  the  robustness  of our  results.
To control  for  characteristics  of  borrower  countries  we employ  variables
similar  to those  employed  in  previous  studies. These  variables  are:  debt-
to-exports  ratio,  reserves-to-imports  ratio,  real  GNP  per capita,  lagged-
value-of-investment-to-GNP  ratio,  rate  of inflation,  debt-to-GNP  ratio,
imports-to-GNP  ratio,  and  reserves-to-GNP  ratio. In addition  to these
standard  indicators,  some  structural  variables  have also  been considered.
These  inrlude  the  share  of agriculture  in  GDP  and  a measure  of income
distribution.  A lower  agricultural  base and  unequal  income  distribution  have
both  been argued  to  contribute  to  political  instability  and therefore  to a
less  favorable  environment  for  timely  repayment  (Berg  and Sach (1989)).
A cursory  look  at the  data  suggests  that  the  debt  of countries  with bad
repayment  prospects  is more  likely  to be traded  at a discount  in the  secondary
market. In  Table  1 the  means  and  standard  errors  of the  repayment  indicators
for  the  countries  in  our sample  are  presented. Our  data contains  information
on 43 developing  countries,  based  on data  availability,  for  the  period  of
1986-88. In this  sample  the  debt  of 23  countries  was traded  at a discount.
Overall,  the  repayment  indicators  appear  worse  for  these  23 countries.
Furthermore,  almost  all  of the  countries  in this  group  have had rescheduling
agreements  with their  creditor  banks,  in  contrast  to the  remaining  group  with
almost  no reschedulings.
Table  1  also indicates  that  those  countries  with debts-that  are traded  at
a discount  have larger  debt  outstanding  to  private  creditors. A closer27
inspection  of this  variable  for  countries  that  are  not in the traded  group is
instructive. In this  group  countries  that  might  be judged  to have  good
repayment  prospects  have larger  outstanding  debt to  private  creditors: near
16  billion  1986  U.S.  dollars  for  Korea  and  near  6 billion  1986  U.S. dollars
for  Greece. In contrast,  countries  with relatively  bad  repayment  prospects,
such  as Ethiopia,  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  also  appear  in this  group. Debt to
private  creditors  are .08  billion  1986  U.S. dollars,  and .19  billion  1986  U.S.
dollars  for  Ethiopia  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago  respectively.  One plausible
explanation  for  these  observations  is that  the  transaction  costs  incurred  in
trading  private  debt on the  secondary  market  prevents  trading  for  countries
with a small  amount  of  private  debt.
Table  2 presents  some  summary  information  concerning  che  secondary  market
discounts  for the  23  countries  whose  debt  was traded  at a discount  in the
market  over the 1986-88  period. The  discounts  presented  in this  table  are
calculated  using  bid prices. The  mean discount  for  all  countries  over the
period  1986-88  is  52.27  (with  a standard  deviation  of 25.56).
The  variable  of interest  is the  degree  of concentration  of debt in the
hands  of the  large  international  banks  relative  to  small  banks.  The  model
suggests  that  we incorporate  information  on all  banks  that  have outstanding
loans  to a country. In  our  empirical  analysis,  however,  we will  be restricted
to  data for  U.S. banks  only,  since  bank  exposure  data  for individual  countries
are  available  only for  U.S.  banks  in a systematic  way.  Since  U.S  banks  have
historically  been the  major  players  in the  market,  however,  one  may  argue that
not  having  other  countries'  banks  may  not  be a major  defect.
Another  issue  raised  in  creating  a measure  of concentration  across
countries  is  how the  large  banks  should  be selected. Should  the  set  of large28
banks  be the  same  for  each  country  or should,  for  each country,  a number  of
banks  with the  highest  exposure  to that  country  be selected? Since  our
theoretical  model  does  not incorporate  differences  among  large  banks,  there  is
not  a clear  theoretical  argument  for  choosing  one strategy  over the  other.
The  nature  of the  available  data,  however,  only  permits  us to look  at a
constant  set  of  large  banks. One may  argue,  in  any case,  that  choosing  the
same  set  of the  largest  money  center  banks,  independently  of particular
country  exposure,  is the  more sensible  strategy. The large  money  center  banks
have  been unfailingly  the  most important  players  in  making  these  loans  and
most likely  are the  banks  with  the  greatest  volume  of business,  in  addition  to
debt,  with the  debtor  countries. In  comparison  with the smaller  banks,  the
large  banks  have greater  exposure  overall  to  all foreign  borrowers. This also
leads  us to  believe  that  they  are  the  ones that  would  be more likely  to lobby
for  the imposition  of penalties  on defaulting  countries.
The  exposure  data  that  we use to compute  debt  concentration  is compiled
by the  Federal  Rese-ve  Board. In this  data  banks  are  categorized  as the
largest  nine,  the  next largest  15,  and remaining  U.S.  banks.  Largeness,  in
this  data, is  measured  by t1  asset  size  of the  banks.  Accordingly,  one
measure  that  can  be created  using  this  data is the  exposure  of the largest
nine  U.S. banks  to  a country  scaled  by the  exposure  of the  U.S.  banks that  are
not in the  largest  24 banks  to that  country  (from  here  on, variable  name is
conl).  For the  countries  in  our sample  we present  the  mean and the  standard
deviation  for  this  variable  on a country  basis  in Table  2.15 The total  sample
15Conl  was  computed  as 174  and 30 for  Zambia  and  Malawi-respectively.
These  countries  were excluded  from  the  analysis  not  only because  these  numbers
are  extraordinarily  high  relative  to the  sample  mean,  but also they  show very
high  volatility  between  quarters  suggesting  deficiency  in the  data.29
mean is 5.08  with  a standard  deviation  of 2.30.  It  also  appears  that
borrowers  with high  discounts  also  have low  levels  of concentration. The
partial  correlation  coefficient  between  discounts  and concentration  is
significantly  different  from  zero  and its  magnitude  is -.22,  supporting  the
view that  discounts  (prices)  and the  concentration  of debt in the  hands of
largest  U.S.  banks  are  negatively  (positively)  correlated.
An alternative  measure  of concentration  is calculated  by scaling  the
exposure  of largest  nine  U.S.  banks to the  total  outstanding  private  debt  of a
country  (con2). The reason  for  creating  this  variable  is to attempt  to
control  for  the  presence  of smaller  banks  from  countries  other  than the  U.S.
in negotiations.  The  m ins  and  standard  deviations  on a country  basis are
presented  in  Table  2.
Two  other  issues  require  care in  this investigation.  First,  since it  has
been demonstrated  that  exposure  of large  banks  to countries  is negatively
correlated  with secondary  market  prices  (see  Ozler  and  Huizinga  (1990)),  it is
important  for  us to show  that  concentration  is  not  a mere  proxy for  exposure.
As can  be seen  in  Table  2,  countries  to  which  the  large  U.S.  banks  have high
exposure  trade  at rather  large  discounts,  in contrast  to the larger  borrowers.
Cursory  evidence  suggests  that  this  should  not  be a source  of concern: The
partial  correlation  between  concentration  (conl)  and  exposure,  however,  is
small  (.004)  and  not  statistically  significant. Second,  it  should  be noted
that  the secondary  market  spreads  (calculated  as the  percentage  differences
between  the  offer  and  bid  prices  quoted  in  the  secondary  market)  are large for
some  low  concentration  countries. This  observation  suggests  that  an
investigation  of secondary  market  prices  based  on solely  the  bid prices  may  be
misleading.30
4.3  Estimation  Results
In  this  section  we present  results  from  the  estimations  of the  equations
described  in the  previous  section: the  probit  specification  for  the
occurrence  of trading  in the  secondary  market  as in equation  (13),  and  the
secondary  market  discounts  specified  4n (16). The primary  result  of our
empirical  investigation  is that  the  discount  in the  secondary  market  decreases
with increased  debt concentration.
In order  to investigate  the  robustness  of these  results  we attempted  a
number  of alternative  specifications  in  the  estimation  of the two  equations.
Three  issues  require  attention: First,  it is important  to establish  that the
results  are not  a consequence  of a  particular  choice  of economic  indicators  as
measures  of country  risk  among  the  potential  ones.  In  order to address  the
first  potential  problem  we employed  alternative  specifications  of country
characteristics.  Second,  the  results  should  not  be contaminated  by specific
market  characteristics  such  as the  size  of the  spread  between  the  bid and  ask
prices. To address  the  second  source  of concern,  we calculated  the  discounts
as averages  of bid  and  ask  prices  in the  secondary  markers. Third,  since it
has  been  demonstrated  that  creditor  country  factors  such  as the  exposure
distribution  of banks  and  bank capital  aggregate  are important  in secondary
market  price  determination,  it is important  to demonstrate  in  our estimations
that  inclusion  of these  variables  does  not  change  the  qualitative  conclusions
concerning  the  concentration  variable.
In  Tables  3-6  we present  estimation  results  for two  basic  empirical
models  with alternative  specifications.  We next  describe  tie differences
between  these  models  and  various  specifications: (In  addition  to the31
variables  that  are  described  below,  each specification  employs  region  specific
and  quarterly  dummy  variables.) Model  1 (presented  in  Ta.les  3-4)
incorporates  the  following  basic  variables: stock  of debt to private
creditors,  debt-to-exports,  reserves-to-imports  ratios,  real  GNP per  capita,
and  the inflation  rate.  Alternative  specifications  of this  model include
investment-to-GNP  ratio,  a measure  of income  distribution,  and share  of
agriculture  in  GDP,  and  a measure  of bank  exposure  and  bank capital. Model  2
(presented  in  Tables  5-6)  replaces  debt-to-exports  and reserves-to-imports  by
debt-to-GNP,  imports-to-GNP,  and reserves-to-GNP.  Alternative  specifications
of  Model  2 are  structured  analogous  to the  alternatives  of Model 1.
Table  3  primarily  indicates  that  bank  concentration  is negatively  related
to the  discounts. The  variable  is  found  to  be a significant  determinant  of
secondary  market  discounts  as indicated  by large  "t"  values.  The result  is
robust  to  using  the  alternative  measures  of the  concentration  variable  and to
the  inclusion  of exposure  and  capital  variables. The  estimations  suggest  that
higher  debt-to-exports  ratio,  higher  inflation,  lower  GNP per  capita,  and
lower  reserves-to-imports  ratio  increase  the  likelihood  that  the debt  of a
country  is traded  at a discount  in the  secondary  market.  (The  estimated
probabilities  of trading  are large  for  all  countries  for  which there  is
trading  and  drop  dramatically  for  the  remaining  countries.) In the  same table
we also  observe  that  variables  that  contribute  towards  the  occurrence  of trade
increase  the  magnitude  of discounts;  the  variables  that  decrease  the
likelihood  of trading  decrease  the  magnitude  of discounts. An exception  is
the  amount  of debt outstanding  to  private  creditors  An increase  in this
variable  increases  the  likelihood  of trading,  but decreases  'the  discounts.
The income  distribution  variable  is incorporated  only in the  discount  equation32
since  it  was not  possible  to estimate  the  probit  equation  when this  variable
is incorporated.  The sign  of the  income  distribution  variable  indicates  trhat
the  debt  of countries  with  historically  worse  income  distribution  is traded  at
lower  discounts  in the  secondary  market  (this  is in  contrast  to the finding  of
Berg  and  Sachs (1988)).
Table  4 is  a further  variation  of  Model 1.  The  basic finding  that the
concentration  of debt is negatively  related  to the  magnitude  of the  discounts
continues  to  hold.  Investment-to-GNP  ratio  and  the  share  of the  agriculture
sector  in  GDP are incorporated  in  Model  1,  both in the  estimation  of the
probit  equation  and in  second  stage  equation. An increase  in the  magnitude  of
either  of the  variables  is found  to decrease  the  probability  of trading  in the
secondary  market. Share  of agriculture  is  also  found  to decrease  the
magnitude  of discounts.
Tables  5  and 6 are  exposited  the  same  way as  Tables  3 and  4, except  that
the  basic  underlying  structure  is that  of Model  2.  The main finding  continued
to  hold:  debt  concentration  is found  to  have a  negative  impact  on the
magnitude  of discounts  in the  secondary  market  and this  finding  is robust  to
alternative  definitions  of the  concentration  variable  as well as to the
incorporation  of bank  exposure  and  capital  variables. In  addition,  these
tables  indicate  that  GNP  per  capita  and  inflation  rates  continue  to  hold the
same  signs  as in  Tables  3-4  and  they  remain  important  determinants  of trading.
Higher  reserves-to-GNP,  higher  imports-to-GNP,  higher  debt-service-payments-
to-exports  ratio  all reduce  the  likelihood  of trading. Estimated
probabilities  from  all these  specifications  also seem  reasonable  in that
actual  no-trading  countries  are assigned  quite  low  probabilities  of being
traded,  in  contrast  to the  remaining  countries. As in  Model 1,  worse  income33
distribution  is found  to contribute  to increased  probability  of trading  but it
appears  to reduce  the  discounts.
Overall,  the  signs  of repayment  indicators  are  consistent  with their
expected  signs: high debt-to-exports  ratio  or a high ratio  of debt-to-GNP
makes  non-payment  more likely. The  negative  sign  of reserves-to-GNP  ratio
suggest  that it is  an indicator  of the  level  of international  liquidity  of the
borrower. A high ratio  of imports  to GNP  may  make the  borrower  more
creditworthy  since  the  borrower  may  become  more vulnerable  to trade  embargoes.
High inflation  appears  to  be an indicator  of a larger  probability  of balance
of payments  crisis. Finally,  countries  with  high  GNP per  capita  are found  to
be more  creditworthy.
It is important  to  note that  our finding  are  not a consequence  of a few
extraordinarily  influential  observations. Specifically,  the  magnitude  of
spreads  between  the  hid and ask  prices  of the  secondary  market  for  some
countries  may  raise  this  concern. As indicated  in  Table  2, the  spreads  for
Bolivia,  Liberia,  Peru  and  Sudan  are  quite  large  (18,  37, 18,  61 percent
respectively).  Our findings,  however,  are  robust  to the  exclusion  of these
countries  from the  sample.
To summarize,  the finding  that  emerges  from  these  tables  is that  the
degree  to  which  a country's  debt is concentrated  is  an important  determinant
of the  magnitude  of its  secondary  market  discount. In  particular,  a higher
debt  concentration  leads  to a lower  (higher)  secondary  market  discount
(price). How important  is the  magnitude  of this  effect? Evaluated  at the
mean of our sample  (near  52  and 5 for  discount  and  concentration  (conl)
respectively),  doubling  the  concentration  would  yield  a chawge  in  the
discounts  in range  of 7  cents to 30  cents  on the  dollar. The range  is a34
function  of the  alternative  magnitudes  (in  the  range - 12 to -.59) for  the
estimated  parameter  value for  conl in  various  specifications.  Most
specifications  yield  parameter  values  for  the  variable  conl near (-.25),  a
magnitude  that  would indicate  that  a doubling  of concentration  from  the  sample
mean of 5 to 10  would  cause  a 13  cent  decrease  in secondary  market  discounts.
Concluding  Remarks
Evaluations,  both normative  and  positive,  of different  schemes  to  deal
with the  debt crisis  rely  on secondary  market  prices  as indicators  of the
expected  value  of a country's  repayments. In these  analyses  it is  often
assumed,  sometimes  implicitly,  that  secondary  market  prices  reflect  only
features  associated  with a country's  economic  performance. By way of
contrast,  in this  paper  we argue  that  certain  characteristics  of a country's
creditors,  in  particular  the  degree  of concentration  of a country's  debt in
the  hands  of the largest  U.S.  banks,  will also  affect  a country's  repayment
prospects  and,  hence,  secondary  market  prices. We conduct  a theoretical  and
empirical  investigation  of this  issue.
In the  context  of a model  that  distinguishes  between  large  money  center
banks and  smaller  regional  banks,  we show  that the  percentage  of a country's
debt  held  by the  large  banks  affects  the  secondary  market  price  of that
country's  debt:  the  higher  the  concentration  of the  debt,  the  higher  the
secondary  market  price. We also  show that  if  debt is freely  traded  in the
secondary  market,  the  entire  stock  of debt  will not eventually  end  up being
owned  by the large  banks. Our empirical  analysis  incorporates  a number  of
potential  determinants  of secondary  market  prices. Among  these  are  variables
that  are  associated  with a  country's  economic  performance,  variables  that  can35
be associated  with the  regulatory  structure  in the  creditor's  country,  and the
concentration  of debt in  the  hands  of the  largest  US  banks.  Our empirical
findings  indicate  that  concentration  indeed  has a positive  effect  on secondary
market  prices.
This  research  highlights  the  potential  importance  that  characteristics
other than  those  possessed  by the  debtor  country  can  have on secondary  market
prices. Future  investigation  of the  roles  played  by different  characteristics
of creditor  banks  may  prove to  contribute  to the  understanding  and resolution
of the  debt crisis.36
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I  FIGURE 140
Table  1
Sample  Characteristics
For  Countries  Whose  Assets  Are:'
Traded  Not Traded
Standard  Standard
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation
Debtexp  4.02  2.47  2.62  2.22
Resimp  1.20  1.00  1.03  0.74
Rgnp  1.30  0.76  2.03  2.05
Inf  0.10  0.13  0.02  0.03
Invgnpb  0.18  0.05  0.22  0.06
Debtgnp  0.71  0.34  0.40  0.16
Resgnp  0.22  0.18  0.39  0.64
Impgnp  0.22  0.11  0.37  0.37
Incratc  0.19  0.09  0.08  0.02
Agrat  0.15  0.07  0.19  0.11
Pridebt  5.07  6.62  3.76  4.21
(Variable  definitions  and sources  are provided  below.)
Notes:
the countries  whose  debt is traded  in the  secondary  market  are: Argentina,
Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa-Rica,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Honduras,
Ivory  Coast,  Jamaica,  Liberia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Panama,  Peru,  Philippines,  Sudan,
Turkey,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Yugoslavia,  Zaire.
The remaining  countries  in our  sample  are:  Cameroon,  Egypt,  El Salvador,
Ethiopia,  Greece,  Hungary,  India,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Jordan,  Kenya,  Korea,  Pakistan,
Paraguay,  Portugal,  Singapore,  Sri  Lanka,  Thailand,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Tunisia.
tfhis  variable  is not  available  for  Argentina,  Mexico,  Sudan,  Turkey,  and
Zaire.
hlhese  series  are  obtained  from  Sachs  and Berg (1988)  and  are  not available  for
Bolivia,  Cameroon,  Dominican-Republic,  El Salvador,  Ethiopia,  Greece,  Honduras,
Jamaica.  Jordan,  Liberia,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Sudan,  Venezuela,  Zaire.41
Table  1 (Continued)
Variable  Definitions  and  Sources:
(Variables  that  are  not  noted  as quarterly  are  measured  as annually.)
Detexp  :  Ratio  of total  public  outstandin&  debt to exports  (exports  are quarterly)
Resimp  : Ratio of total  reserves  to imports  (both  quarterly)
Rgnp  : GNP per capita  in thousands  of 1986  U.S. dollars
Inf  :  Rate of inflation  (quarterly)
Invgnp  :  Ratio  of domestic  investment  to  GNP
Detgnp  Total  public  debt  to GNP  ratio
Impgnp  Imports  to  GNP ratio  (imports  are  quarterly)
Resgnp  Reserves  to  GNP ratio  (reserves  are  quarterly)
Agr  :  A dummy  variable  indicating  that  a country  has signed  a rescheduling
agreement  with its  bank  creditors
Incrat  :  A measure  of income  distribution,  defined  as the  ratio  of the  highest
income  quartile  to the  lowest  income  quartile  for the  early  1970s. The
variable  is available  for  the  cross-section  of some countries.
Agrat  :  Agriculture  to  GDP ratio  averaged  over the  period  of 1970-1981.
Pridebt  :  Debt outstanding  to  private  creditors  in billions  to U.S.  dollars
(quarterly)
Sources:  International  Financial  Statistics  (IMF),  World  Debt Tables  (The  World
Bank),  Sachs  and  Berg (1988).'2
Table 2
Country  (1)  (2)  (2)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Argentina  53.33  18.76  7.38  1.00  0.87  2.82  6.48
Bolivia  91.32  2.01  3.04  1.01  0.05  18.32  0.04
Brazil  41.03  13.66  5.45  1.44  0.60  2.43  15.86
Chile  36.92  4.77  3.98  0.88  0.81  2.44  3.92
Columbia  23.90  10.15  5.10  0.75  0.38  2.00  1.52
Costa Rica  70.80  14.96  2.91  0.51  0.36  9.49  0.20
Dominican Republic 65.42  11.91  5.50  0.57  0.60  7.05  0.28
Ecuador  54.33  19.40  2.87  0.60  1.34  4.31  1.17
Honduras  67.29  8.42  1.74  0.75  0.11  8.46  0.05
Ivory Coast  43.95  21.64  5.84  1.30  0.09  5.57  0.28
Jamaica  59.72  4.99  6.95  1.20  0.48  9.43  0.12
Liberia  91.54  5.02  2.96  0.88  0.47  37.72  0.03
Mexico  46.73  5.11  2.68  0.42  0.63  2.38  13.29
Morocco  38.77  9.45  7.99  1.62  0.43  3.16  0.59
Panama  49.14  21.37  3.55  0.90  0.49  5.97  0.54
Peru  87.75  6.47  2.92  0.35  0.18  18.64  0.57
Philippines  40.38  8.30  8.97  1.45  0.44  3.04  3.37
Sudan  95.38  3.67  6.08  3.29  0.02  61.91  0.02
Turkey  2.53  0.65  5.52  1.05  0.15  1.47  1.15
Uruguay  36.12  4.73  8.53  0.72  0.90  2.91  0.68
Venezuela  35.96  12.33  5.96  0.24  0.52  2.15  6.14
Yugoslavia  34.97  15.91  4.14  0.45  0.17  2.46  1.24
Zaire  77.91  2.81  6.78  0.97  0.02  13.89  0.007
Notes:
Col(l)  :  Average discount in the secondary market (100-bid price) over the 1986-
1988 period.
Col(2)  :  Standard deviation of the discounts.
Col(3)  Exposvre of top nine US banks scaled by the exposure of US banks that are
not in the top 24 (Conl).  The variable is computed as an average over
the 1986-1988 period.
Col(4)  :  Standard deviation of Conl.
Col(5)  :  Exposure of top nine US banks scaled by total outstanding private debt o,
the country (Con3).  The variable is computed as an average over the
1986-1988 period.
Col(6)  Percentage difference between the bid and ask prices in the secondary
market.
Col(7)  :  The exposure of the top nine US banks in US$ billion.
Sources:  Indicarive Prices for Less Developed Country Bank Loans, Salomon Brothers.
Country Exposure Lending Survey, Federal Reserve Board.
World Debt Tables, The World Bank.43
Notes to  Tables  3-6
The numbers  in  parentheses  are nt" values.
The dependent  variable  in  the  second  stage  equation  (eq.  16)  is the logarithm
of discounts. The  discounts  are  calculated  as (100  - avprice)  where
avprice  is the  average  of  bid and  ask  prices.
Lconl  and  Lcon2  are  the  logs  of concentration  measures  conl  and  con2.
Lex9  and  Lk9  are the  logs  of top  nine US  bank exposure  and  capital
respectively. Both  variables  are  in thousands  of 1986  US $.
Not reported  here  are  coefficients  of quarterly  dummies.
In  Table  3 and  Table 5  columns  (2-4)  are 2nd  stage  equations. They all  use
the  specification  in  column  (1)  for  the  1st  stage  in  the  respective
tables.
In Table  4 and  Table  6, column  (2)  employs  column  (1)  and  column  (4)  employs
column  (3)  as first  stage  equations.44
Table 3
Secondary  Market Prices  and  Concentration  --  Model 1
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Lconl  -0.26  -0.21  -0.59









Pridebt  0.27E-06  -0.16E-07  -0.13E-07  0.56E-08  -0.10E-07
(6.62)  (-3.34)  (-2.62)  (1.04)  (-1.57)
Debtexp  0.84E-03  0.37E-03  0.26E-03  0.36E-03  0.60E-04
(2.16)  (3.25)  (2.10)  (3.39)  (0.30)
Resimp  -0.80E-02  -0.85E-03  -0.11E-02  -0.42E-03  -0.21E-02
(-6.07)  (-2.45)  (-3.16)  (-1.24)  (-3.20)
Rgnp  -0.88  -0.13  -0.13  -0.67E-01  -0.48E-01
(-5.19)  (-2.26)  (-2.35)  (-1.14)  (-0.67)
nf  0.16  0.11E-01  0.1lE-01  O.llE-01  0.13E-01
(6.42)  (3.91)  (3.96)  (4.25)  (3.79)
Latin  4.15  1.02  1.2R  1  . 1.  7':
(9.40)  (3.71)  (4.73)  (0.27)  (4.76)
Africa  2.20  0.97  1.00  0.85  1.26
(6.31)  (3.68)  (3.83)  (3.30)  (3.84)
Constant  -1.75  4.56  3.07  -5.90  6.52
(-3.32)  (9.31)  (9.86)  (-3.62)  (10.67)
Millsinv  0.22E-02  0.11  0.16  0.86
(0.01)  (0.48)  (0.64)  (2.34)
McFadden  0.58
R-Square
% of Right  0.88
Predictions
Nobs at 1:  237
Nobs  at 0:  208
Adjusted  0.38  0.37  0.43  0.38
R-Square45
TablI.  4
Secondary  Market  Prices  and Concentration  --  Model 1
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Lconl  -0.28  -0.26
(-4.59)  (-2.72)
Invgnp  -0.79E-01  -0.45E-02
(-4.12)  (-0.61)
Agrat  -0.34  -0.35E-01
(-2.64)  (-5.44)
Pridebt  0.26E-06  -0.1OE-07  0.59E-06  -0.14E-07
(5.63)  (-2.03)  (4.24)  (-2.62)
Debtexp  0.51E-03  0.21E-03  0.38E-03  0.20E-04
(1.11)  (1.17)  (3.87)  (0.12)
Resimp  -0.75E-02  -0.11E-02  -0.15E-01  -0.99E-03
(-5.39)  (-2.44)  (-3.87)  (-2.61)
Rgnp  -0.52  -0.21  -6.03  -0.18
(-2.66)  (-3.86)  (-4.44)  (-2.69)
Inf  0.84E-01  0.61E-02  0.51  0.88E-02
(2.92)  (2.76)  (4.84)  (3.02)
Latin  4.13  0.43  11.56  0.96
(9.25)  (2.07)  (5.06)  (3.74)
Africa  1.96  0.13  3.88  0.78
(5.04)  (0.93)  (3.80)  (2.83)
Constant  -0.11  5.51  7.69  5.27
(-0.16)  (11.35)  (2.16)  (9.90)
Millsinv  0.13  0.39
(0.80)  (1.10)
MrFAdden  0.57  0 83
R-Square
% of Right  0.89  0.93
Predictions
Nobs  at 1:  171  174
Nobs  at 0:  196  140
Adjusted  0.41  . 0.34
R-Square46
Table  5
Secondary  Market Prices and  Concentration  *-  Model 2
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Lconl  -0.21  -0.13  -0.33









Pridebt  0.52E-06  -0.18E-07  -0.17E-07  0.25E-08  -0.43E-08
(5.24)  (-4.62)  (-4.10)  (0.51)  (-0.60)
Debtgnp  0.17  0.50E-02  0.42E-02  0.31E-02  0.88E-02
(5.57)  (2.93)  (2.44)  (1.79)  (2.86)
Resgnp  -0.81E-01  -0.39E-02  -0.39E-02  -0.16E-02  -0.13E-01
(-3.88)  (-2.44)  (-2.44)  (-1.10)  (-3.52)
Impgnp  -0.67E-01  -0.51E-02  -0.45E-02  -0.61E-02  0.16E-01
(-2.62)  (-1.40)  (-1.19)  (-1.75)  (1.19)
Rgnp  -0.59  -0.10  -0.11  -0.68E-01  0.14E-01
(-1.68)  (-1.53)  (-1.72)  (-1.06)  (0.18)
Inf  0.45  0.79E-02  0.67E-02  0.64E-02  0.12E-01
(4.94)  (3.07)  (2.80)  (2.84)  (3.03)
Latin  5.51  0.68  0.79  0.68  1.45
(5.31)  (2.91)  (3.39)  (2.90)  (3.39)
Africa  1.26  0.49  0.46  0.42  0.54
(1.22)  (1.82)  (0.26)  (1.58)  (1.36)
Constant  -1.63  4.50  3.45  -5.99  4.30
(-4.87)  (10.24)  (9.98)  (-3.68)  (5.08)
Millsinv  -0.62  -0.69  -0.61  0.47
(-2.07)  (-2.37)  (-2.10)  (0.78)
McFadden  0.84
R-Square
I  of  Right  0.95
Predictions
Nobs  at 1:  239
Nobs  at  0:  208
Adjusted  0.42  0.42  0.46  0.37
R-Square47
Table  6
Secondary  Market  Prices  and  Concentration  --  Model  2
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Lconl  -0.37  -0.12
(-6.48)  (-2.21)
Invgnp  -0.37  -0.15E-01
(-3.69)  (-2.09)
Agrat  -1.21  -0.18E-01
(-2.52)  (-2.15)
Pridebt  0.13E-05  -0.87E-08  0.17E-05  -0.68E-08
(4.22)  (-1.87)  (2.96)  (-1.11)
Debtgnp  0.30  0.95E-02  0.42  0.94E-02
(4.29)  (4.70)  (2.67)  (3.06)
Resgnp  -0.89E-01  -0.47E-02  -0.24  -0.53E-02
(-2.41)  (-2.65)  (-2.89)  (-2.14)
Impgnp  -0.95E-01  -0.54E-02  0.13  0.82E-03
(-1.91)  (-1.43)  (1.45)  (0.07)
Rgnp  -0.88  -0.60E-01  -16.49  -0.23E-01
(-1.33)  (-1.14)  (-2.67)  (-0.24)
Inf  0.79  0.72E-02  1.99  0.76E-02
(3.76)  (3.56)  (2.91)  (2.56)
Latin  10.83  -U.30E-01  30.34  0.55
(2.60)  (-0.27)  (2.97)  (2.21)
Africa  -0.81  -0.37  1.47  0.78E-01
(-0.52)  (-3.26)  (0.67)  (0.27)
Constant  -1.41  6.02  -0.43  3.78
(-0.14)  (15.15)  (-0.05)  (4.51)
Millsinv  -0.24
(-1.62)
McFadden  0.92  0.92
R-Square
%  of Right  0.98  0.98
Predictions
Nobs  at 1:  173  176
Nobs  at 0:  196  140
Adjusted  0.54  0.38
R-SquarePRE  'Wkng  &
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